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TULIPS, ORANGES, WORMS, AND COINS – VIRTUAL, DIGITAL, OR 
CRYPTO CURRENCY AND THE SECURITIES LAWS 
Thomas Lee Hazen* 
This Article examines the applicability of the federal securities laws 
to digital currencies. Although some enforcement actions have been 
brought by the SEC, digital currency transactions remain largely 
unregulated. The securities laws contain a broad definition of what 
constitutes a security. Finding a security to exist triggers many 
regulatory provisions of the securities laws. There is considerable 
case law interpreting the now well-developed test for what 
constitutes an “investment contract” leading to the finding that a 
security exists. However, to date, there is sparse authority applying 
the securities laws to virtual, digital, or crypto currencies. This 
article examines the investment contract analysis and concludes that 
initial coin offerings and many, if not most, digital currency 
transactions involve securities and therefore are subject to SEC 
jurisdiction and to the jurisdiction of state securities administrators. 
The article then outlines the regulatory consequences of applying 
the securities laws to digital currency transactions. 
 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND .......................................494 
II.  BACKGROUND – THE DEVELOPMENT OF CRYPTO 
CURRENCIES .......................................................................496 
III.  DEFINITION OF “SECURITY;” THE HOWEY TEST AND THE 
RISK CAPITAL ANALYSIS ...................................................501 
A. The Statutory Definition................................................501 
B. The Howey Test ............................................................503 
C. The Risk Capital Analysis .............................................505 
                                                 
 *  Cary C. Boshamer Distinguished Professor of Law, The University of North 
Carolina at Chapel Hill. Portions of this article are adapted from Thomas Lee 
Hazen, Virtual or Crypto Currencies and the Securities Laws, 38 FUT. & DERIV. 
L. REP. 1 (2018). 
494 N.C. J.L. & TECH. [VOL. 20: 493 
IV.  CRYPTO CURRENCY AS A SECURITY ...................................508 
V.  CONSEQUENCES OF CLASSIFYING A CRYPTO CURRENCY AS A 
SECURITY ............................................................................514 
A. 1933 Act Registration Requirements ............................514 
B. State Regulation ............................................................516 
C. Exemptions from 1933 Act Registration .......................517 
D. Other Consequences of Classifying Crypto Currency as a 
Security .........................................................................521 
VI.  CONCLUSION ........................................................................526 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
Over the years, a wide variety of nontraditional investments 
from orange groves to earthworms and scotch whiskey have been 
held to be securities.1 But what about virtual, digital, or crypto 
currency (hereinafter collectively referred to as crypto currency)? 
During the seventeenth century, speculation resulted in the 
infamous tulip bubble.2 The lessons for virtual, digital, or crypto 
currencies should not be ignored. The tulip bubble has been 
summarized as follows: 
One of the largest speculative bubbles began in 1593 when tulips were 
brought to Holland, and over time, the tulips began to contract viruses 
that made flame-like colors appear on the bulbs. Tulips with flame-like 
color patterns were trading at much higher values than the unaffected 
bulbs, and by the 1630s, everyone in Holland began trading the bulbs; 
tulip-mania was born. Actual price data from the 1630s is scarce, but the 
Rijksmuseum (the Museum of the Netherlands) claims that traders were 
putting up their houses as collateral to secure tulip bulbs. The price of 
the tulips during this period was not an accurate representation of what 
                                                 
 1 See, e.g., SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946) (holding that an 
orange grove can be considered a security); SEC v. Haffenden–Rimar Int’l., Inc., 
362 F. Supp. 323 (E.D. Va. 1973), aff’d, 496 F.2d 1192 (4th Cir. 1974) (holding 
that scotch whiskey can be considered a security); In re Worm World, Inc., 3 Blue 
Sky L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 71,414 (S.D. Dep’t. of Comm. & Consumer Aff. 1978) 
(holding that earthworms can be considered securities). For a more complete 
taxonomy of investments that have been held to be securities, see 1 THOMAS LEE 
HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 1:49 (7th ed. 2016). 
 2 See, e.g., CHARLES MACKAY, MEMOIRS OF EXTRAORDINARY POPULAR 
DELUSIONS AND THE MADNESS OF CROWDS (1841) (discussing the tulip bubble). 
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the bulbs were actually worth, and once some investors decided to sell, 
the price of bulbs began to fall. When this happened, other investors sold 
their tulips to avoid even bigger losses, and the bubble burst.3 
As compared to crypto currencies, tulips at least have some intrinsic 
value.4 In light of the massive investor losses that have occurred and 
are likely to continue to result from virtual or crypto currencies, 
appropriate regulation is necessary.5 
The securities laws’ definition is expansive because of its 
inclusion of “investment contract” in the statutory definition6 and 
the courts’ interpretation of that phrase.7 This article concludes that 
                                                 
 3 Nathan J. Sherman, Note, A Behavioral Economics Approach to Initial Coin 
Offerings, 107 GEO. L.J. ONLINE 17, 21 (2018) (footnotes omitted) (first citing 
Andrew Beattie, Market Crashes: The Tulip and Bulb Craze 
(1630s), INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/features/crashes/crashes
2.asp (last visited Jan. 12, 2019); then citing Elvis Picardo, Five of the Largest 
Asset Bubbles in History, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/ 
articles/personal-finance/062315/five-largest-asset-bubbles-history.asp (last 
updated June 23, 2015)); see also Erik F. Gerding, Laws Against Bubbles: An 
Experimental-Asset-Market Approach to Analyzing Financial Regulation, 
2007 WIS. L. REV. 977, 990 (2007) (describing tulip mania). 
 4 Alex Hern, Bitcoin hype worse than ‘tulip mania’, says Dutch central banker, 
GUARDIAN (Dec. 4, 2013), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/dec/0
4/bitcoin-bubble-tulip-dutch-banker (quoting former Dutch Central Bank 
president: “‘This is worse than the tulip mania,’ he continued. ‘At least then you 
got a tulip [at the end], now you get nothing.’” (alteration in original)). 
 5 See, e.g., Sherman, supra note 3, at 35 (arguing that “regulators must regulate 
ICOs [initial coin offerings] using an asymmetrically paternalistic framework”); 
see also, e.g., Iris H-Y Chiu, Fintech and Disruptive Business Models in Financial 
Products, Intermediation and Markets – Policy Implications for Financial 
Regulators, 21 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 55 (2016) (discussing policy implications); 
John T. Holden, Trifling and Gambling with Virtual Money, 25 UCLA ENT. L. 
REV. 41 (2018) (discussing regulatory potential and impact on gambling); Misha 
Tsukerman, The Block is Hot: A Survey of the State of Bitcoin Regulation and 
Suggestions for the Future, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1127 (2015) (discussing 
various regulatory approaches); Stephen T. Middlebrook & Sarah Jane Hughes, 
Regulating Cryptocurrencies in the United States: Current Issues and Future 
Directions, 40 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 813 (2014) (same). 
 6 E.g., Section 2(a)(1) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) 
(2018). 
 7 See, e.g., SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946); see also, e.g., Laura 
Gritz, Teaching a New Dog Old Tricks: Why the Howey Test is Still the SEC’s 
Best Friend When Examining Initial Coin Offerings, 19 N.C. J.L. & TECH. ON. 
193 (2018), http://ncjolt.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/Gritz_Final.pdf 
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under most, if not all, circumstances, crypto currencies are likely to 
be securities. This article also explains the consequences under the 
securities laws of classifying a crypto currency as a security. 
II.  BACKGROUND – THE DEVELOPMENT OF CRYPTO 
CURRENCIES 
Crypto currencies are essentially computer code that enables 
their use as digital currencies. Bitcoin became the first widely used 
decentralized digital currency.8 Other virtual currencies followed. 
Bitcoin’s purpose was to create a peer-to-peer version of electronic 
cash to allow for secure online payments without the need for third-
party intermediaries such as banks.9 In order to avoid double-
spending of the same crypto token, public ledgers provide a basis 
for authenticating the currency10 and to confirm that the funds being 
transferred existed in the amount and manner specified.11 
Crypto currencies consist of blockchains. A blockchain is a 
distributed record made of up of processed batches of transactions, 
and each processed batch is referred to as a block. The blocks are 
sequenced, and each block has data associated with it that is the 
result of all the blocks before it. Therefore, the blocks are in this way 
related, or chained, in a manner such that any one change to the 
history would be highly evident, because the subsequent blocks will 
                                                 
(discussing the Howey test and digital currency); Joseph D. Moran, The Impact of 
Regulatory Measures Imposed on Initial Coin Offerings in the United States 
Market Economy, 26 CATH. U. J.L. & TECH. 7 (2018) (discussing the impact of 
the securities laws on virtual currencies); Nicholas Wenker, Online Currencies, 
Real-World Chaos: The Struggle to Regulate the Rise of Bitcoin, 19 TEX. REV. L. 
& POL’Y 145 (2014) (discussing bitcoin and regulation). 
 8 See SATOSHI NAKAMOTO, BITCOIN: A PEER-TO-PEER ELECTRONIC CASH 
SYSTEM, http://www.bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf (describing the rise of bitcoin). 
 9 See id. at 1.  
 10 See generally Kelsey Bolin, Decentralized Public Ledger Systems and 
Securities Law: New Applications of Blockchain Technology and the 
Revitalization of Sections 11 and 12(A)(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, 95 WASH. 
U. L. REV. 955, 957 (2018). 
 11 See Trevor I. Kiviat, Beyond Bitcoin: Issues in Regulating Blockchain 
Transactions, 65 DUKE L.J. 569, 577–78 (2015). 
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change as a result.12 A new transaction is added to the existing 
blockchain when a computer on the crypto currency’s network 
verifies that the transaction is legitimate. All of the computers on the 
crypto currency’s network have access to the blockchain, back to the 
first transaction, and it is continually updated by passing the new 
blocks to other users in the network. A crypto coin file is given a 
unique serial number when a transfer is requested. The new serial 
number is broadcasted to all other computers in the crypto coin 
network who then work to decode the new serial number which 
verifies that the crypto coin’s transferor in fact owns the coin being 
transferred and has not already transferred that coin to someone else. 
A verified transaction becomes the latest block in the blockchain. 
The transactions are secured through public-key encryption. 
Essentially, two mathematically-related keys are generated: the 
private key is for the individual and the other key is made public to 
help encode payments. The private key is used to retrieve those 
payments and to approve transfers. 
Blockchain technology removes the need for the third-party 
because the technology itself verifies the transactions by allowing 
for secure electronic transactions without having a centralized 
ledger or the concern of double-spending.13 The blockchain works 
through the parties of the transaction broadcasting that transaction 
to the network and then requiring the network to validate the 
transaction through a “proof-of-work” validation system.14 The 
proof-of-work validation system is a competition between crypto 
coin network participants to validate the transactions and is 
otherwise known as “mining.”15 Mining verifies the transaction and 
                                                 
 12 For a general discussion of the technology, see Deborah Ginsberg, The 
Building Blocks of Blockchain, 20 N.C. J.L. & TECH. (forthcoming May 
2019). See also, e.g., Lawrence J. Trautman & Mason J. Molesky, A Primer for 
Blockchain, UMKC L. REV. (forthcoming 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3324660. 
 13 See NAKAMOTO, supra note 8, at 8; see also, e.g., How Bitcoin Works, 
BITCOIN, https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/How_bitcoin_works (last visited June 4, 2018); 
J.P., Virtual Currency: Bits and Bob, ECONOMIST (June 13, 2011), 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/babbage/2011/06/virtual-currency. 
 14 See Kiviat, supra note 11, at 578. 
 15 Nikolei M. Kaplanov, Nerdy Money: Bitcoin, the Private Digital Currency, 
and the Case Against Its Regulation, 25 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 111, 119 (2012); 
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removes the need for the third-party intermediary. Verifying a 
crypto transaction involves a race between computers in the network 
to solve a very difficult algorithm problem with the winner receiving 
the crypto currency as compensation. Solving the problem verifies 
that a transaction is valid, and the winner records the transaction 
onto the blockchain.16 Mining is important because it is how the 
network deems a new block or transaction valid.17 
Traditionally, a true currency is backed by a sovereign state,18 
and thus crypto currencies do not qualify under the traditional 
definition. Nevertheless, crypto currencies have been described as 
alternatives to true currency.19 So long as they remain volatile with 
wild price swings this is unlikely to happen. However, when a nation 
has an unusually volatile currency, crypto currencies may have some 
traction as a currency substitute.20 
                                                 
see, e.g., Darren J. Sandler, Citrus Groves in the Cloud: Is Cryptocurrency Cloud 
Mining a Security?, 34 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. J. 250 (2018). 
 16 Edmund Mokhtarian & Alexander Lindgren, Rise of the Crypto Hedge Fund: 
Operational Issues and Best Practices for an Emergent Investment Industry, 23 
STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 112, 120–21 (2018) (describing crypto currency 
mechanics). 
 17 J.P., supra note 13 (describing crypto currency). Additionally, mining helps 
the network police itself. In order for a fraudster to doctor and validate blocks they 
would have to control more than half of the network’s mining capacity. Finally, 
mining increases the number of crypto coins within the total supply. Blocks in the 
network are created at a constant rate with a set number of crypto coins created 
per block which increases the number of crypto coins in circulation. 
 18 See, e.g., 31 C.F.R. § 1010.100(m) (2016) (FinCen’s definition); see also, 
e.g., What is Fiat Money?, CORP. FIN. INST., 
https://corporatefinanceinstitute.com/resources/knowledge/economics/fiat-
money-currency/ (last visited Feb. 22, 2019) (discussing the difference between 
commodity backed currency and fiat currencies backed by government). 
 19 See, e.g., Susan Alkadri, Note, Defining and Regulating Cryptocurrency: 
Fake Internet Money or Legitimate Medium of Exchange, 17 DUKE L. & TECH. 
REV. 71 (2018) (arguing that crypto currency should be treated as money or 
currency for regulatory purposes); Cryptocurrency, INVESTOPEDIA, 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/cryptocurrency.asp (last updated Feb. 12, 
2019) (describing crypto currency). 
 20 See, e.g., A.F., Why Are Venezuelans Mining So Much Bitcoin?, ECONOMIST 
(Apr. 3, 2018), https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2018/04/03/ 
why-are-venezuelans-mining-so-much-bitcoin (discussing currency volatility); 
Billy Bambrough, Bitcoin Believers Speak Out in Venezuela as Maduro Makes 
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The SEC is not the only federal regulator who has a role to play 
with respect to crypto currencies.21 There are a number of other 
potential regulators for the crypto currency markets.22 For example, 
the Commodities Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) regulates 
virtual currency transactions as commodities.23 The United States 
Treasury Department’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network 
(“FinCEN”) also comes into play as may the banking regulators.24 
In addition, the states have entered the crypto currency regulatory 
arena.25 
                                                 
Historical Devaluation, FORBES (Aug. 20, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/ 
sites/billybambrough/2018/08/20/bitcoin-believers-speak-out-in-venezuela-as-
maduro-makes-historical-devaluation/#b7a474445ae5 (same); Iyke Aru, Bitcoin: 
An Alternative Solution to Venezuela’s Economic Crisis, CCN (June 29, 2018), 
https://www.ccn.com/bitcoin-an-alternative-solution-to-venezuelas-economic-
crisis/ (same). 
 21 See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREAS., FINANCIAL CRIMES ENF’T NETWORK, 
FIN-2013-G001, APPLICATION OF FINCEN’S REGULATIONS TO PERSONS 
ADMINISTERING, EXCHANGING, OR USING VIRTUAL CURRENCIES (2013) 
[hereinafter FIN-2013-G001], https://www.fincen.gov/resources/statutes-
regulations/guidance/application-fincens-regulations-persons-administering. 
 22 See, e.g., Scott D. Hughes, Cryptocurrency Regulations and Enforcement in 
the U.S., 45 W. ST. L. REV. 1 (2017) (discussing regulatory alternatives); see also, 
e.g., Lawrence J. Trautman & Alvin C. Harrell, Bitcoin Versus Regulated 
Payment Systems: What Gives?, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 1041 (2017) (discussing 
potential regulation). 
 23 See In re Coinflip, Inc., CFTC No. 15-29, at 3 (Sept. 17, 2015), 
http://www.cftc.gov/idc/groups/public/@lrenforcementactions/documents/legalp
leading/enfcoinfliprorder09172015.pdf (“Bitcoin and other virtual currencies are 
encompassed in the definition and properly defined as commodities.”). See 
generally David E. Aron & Matthew Jones, The CFTC’s Characterization of 
Virtual Currencies as Commodities: Implications Under the Commodity 
Exchange Act and CFTC Regulations, 38 FUTURES & DERIVATIVES L. REP. 1, 
May 2018, No. 5, at 1 (discussing virtual currencies and CFTC jurisdiction); 
NAT’L FUTURES ASS’N, INTERPRETIVE NOTICE 9073, DISCLOSURE 
REQUIREMENTS FOR NFA MEMBERS ENGAGING IN VIRTUAL CURRENCY 
ACTIVITIES (2018), 
https://www.nfa.futures.org/rulebook/rules.aspx?Section=9&RuleID=9073 
(providing that disclosure requirements are applicable to commodities 
professionals with respect to digital currency transactions). 
 24 See, e.g., FIN-2013-G001, supra note 21. 
 25 See, e.g., Benjamin Bain, Wyoming Aims to be America’s Cryptocurrency 
Capital, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (May 15, 2018), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-05-15/wyoming-aims-to-be-
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It can of course be argued that since it is a medium of payment 
which can be used in commerce, investment in a crypto currency is 
based on its use as a currency rather than as an investment for profit. 
However, there are multiple examples of crypto currencies not being 
classified as currency. For example, FinCEN determined that crypto 
currency is not a currency since it is not “legal tender.”26 The IRS 
has concurred,27 as has the CFTC.28 At least one court has expressly 
indicated that notwithstanding Bitcoin’s use as a currency, it was a 
security.29 As discussed more fully in the sections that follow, the 
SEC has initiated action against other crypto currencies by 
characterizing them as securities.30 
                                                 
america-s-cryptocurrency-capital (describing Wyoming crypto currency 
legislation). 
 26 See FIN-2013-G001, supra note 21. 
 27 I.R.S. Notice 2014-21, at 1–2 (Apr. 14, 2014) (explaining that virtual 
currencies are to be treated as property for tax purposes); see also, e.g., I.R.S. 
News Release IR-2018-71 (Mar. 23, 2018), https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/irs-
reminds-taxpayers-to-report-virtual-currency-transactions. 
 28 See CFTC v. McDonnell, 287 F. Supp.3d 213 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) (holding that 
virtual currencies are commodities subject to CFTC jurisdiction and regulatory 
requirements); see also, e.g., CFTC No. 18-14, Advisory with Respect to Virtual 
Currency Derivative Product Listings, 2018 WL 2387847 (May 21, 2018); see 
generally Aron & Jones, supra note 23, at 24 n.75–76; Mitchell Prentis, Digital 
Metal: Regulating Bitcoin as a Commodity, 66 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 609, 624–
25 (2015) (discussing regulating bitcoin under commodities laws). There is at 
least one example of the CFTC and SEC bringing separate enforcement actions 
against the same virtual currency operation. See CFTC v. 1pool Ltd., No. 1:18-
CV-2243, (D.D.C. Sept. 27, 2018), https://www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/2018-
09/enf1poolpatrickajeltakecomplaint092718.pdf; SEC v. 1pool Ltd, No. 1:18-
CV-02244 (D.D.C. Sept. 27, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/ 
complaints/2018/comp-pr2018-218.pdf. 
 29 SEC v. Shavers, 2013 WL 4028182, at *2 (E.D. Tex. 2013). But cf. Edvard 
Pettersson, SEC Handed Setback on Whether Digital Tokens are Securities, 
BLOOMBERG L. (Nov. 28, 2018), https://www.bloomberglaw.com/ 
document/X58TGJ38000000?udv_expired=true (showing that federal court 
denied preliminary injunction against digital coin offering to 32 “test investors”). 
 30 See generally Cyber Enforcement Actions: Digital Assets/Initial Coin 
Offerings, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N., https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/cybersec
urity-enforcement-actions (last updated Apr. 5, 2019) (listing, among other 
actions, cryptocurrency-related enforcement actions); Aron & Jones, supra note 
23; see also, e.g., SEC Div. Corp. Fin. Public Statement, Statement on Digital 
Asset Securities Issuance and Trading (Nov. 16, 2018) [hereinafter SEC Public 
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III.  DEFINITION OF “SECURITY;” THE HOWEY TEST AND THE 
RISK CAPITAL ANALYSIS 
A. The Statutory Definition 
The federal securities laws provide a fairly lengthy definition of 
“security.”31 The statutory definition includes specific items such as 
stock and also includes the broad term “investment contract.”32 The 
definition of securities under the Securities Act of 1933 (“1933 
Act”) and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“1934 Act”) are 
“virtually identical.”33 State securities laws contain a similar 
definition and by and large have adopted the federal courts’ 
interpretations of what constitutes a security.34 Section 2(a)(1) of the 
1933 Act provides: 
(a) When used in this subchapter, unless the context otherwise requires— 
(1) The term “security” means any note, stock, treasury stock, security 
future, security-based swap, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness, 
certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement, 
collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription, 
transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate, 
certificate of deposit for a security, fractional undivided interest in oil, 
gas, or other mineral rights, any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege 
on any security, certificate of deposit, or group or index of securities 
(including any interest therein or based on the value thereof), or any put, 
call, straddle, option, or privilege entered into on a national securities 
exchange relating to foreign currency, or, in general, any interest or 
instrument commonly known as a “security”, or any certificate of interest 
or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, 
                                                 
Statement], https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/digital-asset-securites-
issuuance-and-trading. 
 31 1933 Act § 2(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2018); 1934 Act § 3(a)(10), 
§ 78c(a)(10) (2018). The few differences between the two definitions have no 
impact on the determination of whether crypto currency is a security. 
 32 1933 Act § 2(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2018); 1934 Act § 3(a)(10), 
§ 78c(a)(10) (2018). 
 33 Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967). 
 34 See the Uniform Securities Act § 102(28), which has been adopted by many 
states and parallels the federal statutory definition. See generally Douglas M. 
Branson & Karl Shumpei Okamoto, The Supreme Court’s Literalism and the 
Definition of “Security” in the State Courts, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1043 (1993) 
(discussing state law and the definition of security). 
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guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the 
foregoing.35 
Although the statutory definition includes the term “investment 
contract,” Congress chose not to define that term and therefore left 
its interpretation to the courts. The “investment contract” rubric thus 
provides the context for determining whether unconventional 
investments fall within the securities laws’ definition of security. As 
mentioned above, a number of nontraditional investments have been 
held to be securities. The existence of an investment contract 
depends not so much on what is actually being offered or sold, but 
as on how it is being offered and sold and the expectations of 
investors based on marketing, promotion, and the realities of the 
markets where the investment transaction takes place.36 
In analyzing whether something is a security, the focus is on 
substance rather than form. Thus, whether or not a particular 
investment vehicle falls within the definition of security depends on 
the economic reality of the transaction.37 As a result, the fact that 
crypto currency is described as a coin or currency is beside the point. 
                                                 
 35 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2018) (emphasis added). Although not the primary 
focus of this article, it is worth noting that crypto currencies clearly fall within the 
definition of commodity under the Commodity Exchange Act, which provides: 
(9) Commodity 
The term “commodity” means wheat, cotton, rice, corn, oats, barley, rye, 
flaxseed, grain sorghums, mill feeds, butter, eggs, Solanum tuberosum 
(Irish potatoes), wool, wool tops, fats and oils (including lard, tallow, 
cottonseed oil, peanut oil, soybean oil, and all other fats and oils), 
cottonseed meal, cottonseed, peanuts, soybeans, soybean meal, 
livestock, livestock products, and frozen concentrated orange juice, and 
all other goods and articles, except onions (as provided by section 13-1 
of this title) and motion picture box office receipts (or any index, 
measure, value, or data related to such receipts), and all services, rights, 
and interests (except motion picture box office receipts, or any index, 
measure, value or data related to such receipts) in which contracts for 
future delivery are presently or in the future dealt in. 
7 U.S.C. § 1a(9) (2018) (emphasis added). 
 36 See generally Shlomit Azgad-Tromer, Crypto Securities: On the Risks of 
Investments in Blockchain-Based Assets and the Dilemmas of Securities 
Regulation, 68 AM. U. L. REV. 69 (2018) (discussing different crypto currencies 
and the securities laws). 
 37 See, e.g., United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 849 (1975) 
(“Congress intended the application of these statutes to turn on 
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B. The Howey Test 
The 1946 decision of the United States Supreme Court in SEC 
v. W. J. Howey & Co.,38 established the test for determining when an 
investment contract exists so as to classify an investment as a 
security. Although the Howey test has been refined in the more than 
seventy years since it was first announced, it remains the guiding 
principle. The Court’s opinion set forth that “[a]n investment 
contract for purposes of the Securities Act means a contract, 
transaction or scheme whereby a person [1] invests his money [2] in 
a common enterprise and [3] is led to expect profits [4] solely from 
the efforts of the promoter or a third party.”39 The investment of 
“money” includes the investment of anything of value such as 
property or services.40 It seems clear that crypto currency involves 
an upfront investment of money or something of value. 
The common enterprise requirement focuses on the question of 
the extent to which the success of the investor’s interest rises and 
falls with others involved in the enterprise.41 Crypto currency has no 
inherent value beyond what others are willing to pay for it or value 
it as. Thus, the common enterprise element seems to be satisfied. As 
                                                 
the economic realities underlying a transaction, and not on the name appended 
thereto.”); Tcherepnin, 389 U.S. at 336 (“[I]n searching for the meaning and scope 
of the word ‘security’ in the Act(s), form should be disregarded for substance and 
the emphasis should be on economic reality.”); SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 
293, 298 (1946) (holding that the profitability of the orange groves was in 
economic reality dependent upon using the promoter’s management contract). 
 38 W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. at 293. 
 39 Id. at 298–99. 
 40 See, e.g., Popovice v. Milides, 11 F. Supp. 2d 638, 643 (E.D. Pa. 1998) 
(“[S]everal courts have held that an agreement exchanging services for stock 
constitutes a ‘sale’ under the Securities Exchange Act.”); SEC v. Int’l Heritage, 
Inc., 4 F. Supp. 2d 1378, 1382–83 (N.D. Ga. 1998) (holding that labor can satisfy 
the investment requirement); SEC v. Addison, 194 F. Supp. 709, 722 (N.D. Tex. 
1961) (holding that investment of services can trigger securities laws). 
 41 See, e.g., SEC v. Eurobond Exchange, Ltd., 13 F.3d 1334, 1339 (9th Cir. 
1994) (“A common enterprise is a venture ‘in which the “fortunes of the investor 
are interwoven with and dependent upon the efforts and success of those seeking 
the investment . . . .”’”) (quoting SEC v. Goldfield Deep Mines Co. of Nevada, 
758 F.2d 459, 463 (9th Cir. 1985)); Brodt v. Bache & Co., 595 F.2d 459, 460 (9th 
Cir. 1978); SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enter., Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 482 n.7 (9th Cir. 
1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973). 
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discussed below, the main points of controversy as to whether 
crypto currencies are securities revolves around the profit 
expectation and whether that profit is to be derived from the efforts 
of others.42 A substantial profit motive is sufficient to support this 
aspect of the Howey test, even if it is not the only factor motivating 
investors.43 Although the Supreme Court in Howey spoke in terms 
of the requirement that the profits be secured “solely” from the 
efforts of others,44 the interpretation in subsequent federal cases only 
requires that the profits be expected to be derived primarily or 
“substantially” from the efforts of others.45 
In addition to the Howey factors, courts have looked to the 
presence or absence of another applicable regulatory regime in order 
to determine whether an investment contract and, thus a security, 
exists.46 In a close case, the presence of a regulatory scheme 
covering the investment in question mitigates against classifying the 
investment as a security.47 Conversely, the absence of a parallel 
regulatory scheme to reduce risk will mitigate in favor of finding a 
security.48 Although there is some regulation of crypto currency 
exchanges that register as money transmitters,49 that regulation does 
                                                 
 42 See, e.g., Ruoke Yang, When Is Bitcoin A Security Under U.S. Securities 
Law?, 18 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 99, 111 (2013) (discussing the Howey test’s profit 
requirement as it relates to bitcoin). 
 43 See 1 HAZEN, supra note 1, § 1:54 (discussing the profit requirement of the 
Howey test). 
 44 W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. at 298–99. 
 45 See, e.g., Webster v. Omnitrition Int’l, Inc., 79 F.3d 776, 781 (9th Cir. 1996); 
SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473, 483 (5th Cir. 1974); Glenn W. 
Turner Enter., Inc., 474 F.2d at 482. 
 46 See, e.g., Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 67 (1990) (stating one of the 
factors as “whether some factor such as the existence of another regulatory 
scheme significantly reduces the risk of the instrument, thereby rendering 
application of the Securities Acts unnecessary”); Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 
U.S. 551, 557 (1982) (noting existence of bank regulation as a factor in holding 
that a bank issued certificate of deposit is not a security). 
 47 See, e.g., Reves, 494 U.S. at 67; Marine Bank, 455 U.S. at 557. 
 48 Reves, 494 U.S. at 58 (noting short term note was a security notwithstanding 
the exclusion in the 1934 Act for short term commercial paper). 
 49 See, e.g., FIN-2013-G001, supra note 21; see also DEP’T OF TREASURY, FIN. 
CRIMES ENF’T NETWORK, FIN-2014-R007, APPLICATION OF MONEY SERVICES 
BUSINESS REGULATIONS TO THE RENTAL OF COMPUTER SYSTEMS FOR MINING 
VIRTUAL CURRENCY (2014), https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/administ
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not involve investor protection. This absence of other investor 
protection regulation weighs in favor of classifying crypto 
currencies as securities. It is worth noting, however, that Heather 
Peirce, one of the current SEC Commissioners, believes that the 
Howey test may need to be modified in its application to crypto 
currency but she seems to concede that Congressional action would 
be necessary to do so.50 
C. The Risk Capital Analysis 
An alternative to the Howey test developed under state securities 
laws containing the investment contract language has been 
favorably acknowledged in some federal decisions.51 This risk 
capital analysis is not as limiting as the Howey test since it is not 
bound to the four Howey factors discussed in the previous section. 
As explained by a California case that found country club founder 
interests to be securities: 
It bears noting that the act extends even to transactions where capital is 
placed without expectation of any material benefits . . . . Since the act 
does not make profit to the supplier of capital the test of what is a 
security, it seems all the more clear that its objective is to afford those 
who risk their capital at least a fair chance of realizing their objectives in 
legitimate ventures whether or not they expect a return on their capital in 
one form or another . . . . Properly so, for otherwise it could too easily be 
vitiated by inventive substitutes for conventional means of raising risk 
capital.52 
                                                 
rative_ruling/FIN-2014-R007.pdf (discussing FinCen and virtual currencies); 
James Gatto & Elsa S. Broeker, Bitcoin & Beyond: Current and Future 
Regulation of Virtual Currencies, 9 OHIO ST. ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 429 
(2015) (same); Jacob Hamburger, Comment, Bitcoins v. State Money 
Transmission Laws: Protecting Consumers or Hindering Innovation?, 11 J.L. 
ECON. & POL’Y 229 (2015) (same). 
 50 See Andrew Ramonas, Securities Test May Not Help Classify Crypto, SEC’s 
Pierce Says (1), BLOOMBERG L. (Feb. 8, 2019), 
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/securities-law/securities-test-may-not-help-
classify-crypto-secs-peirce-says-1. 
 51 See, e.g., Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski, 361 P.2d 906 (Cal. 1961); 
State by Comm’r of Sec. v. Hawaii Mkt. Ctr., Inc., 485 P.2d 105, 109 (Haw. 
1971). 
 52 Silver Hills Country Club, 5361 P.2d at 908–09. In Tanenbaum v. Agri–
Capital, Inc., 885 F.2d 464 (8th Cir. 1989), the court conducted a risk capital 
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The risk capital approach can be defined in terms of four factors.53 
The risk capital analysis will result in the finding of an investment 
contract when (1) the investor provides initial value to the 
enterprise; (2) the initial value is subject to the risks of the 
enterprise; (3) the initial value is induced by representations leading 
to a reasonable understanding that the investor will realize a 
valuable benefit beyond the initial value; and (4) the investor does 
not exercise practical and managerial control over the enterprise.54 It 
is possible for this risk capital analysis to classify investments as 
securities that might not satisfy each prong of the Howey test.55 
As noted above, the risk capital analysis is established under the 
law of many states56 and there is some discussion and support in the 
federal courts as well. For example, one federal court commented 
that it is unsettled whether the risk capital test applies to “only 
original ‘start-up’ capitalization or whether it also extends to 
transactions connected with subsequent capitalization.”57 Even with 
                                                 
analysis when applying state law and examining whether cattle embryo contract 
was the sale of a security was a question of fact. See generally id.  
 53 See Hawaii Mkt. Ctr., Inc., 485 P.2d at 109. 
 54 Id. (“An investment contract is created whenever: (1) an offeree furnishes 
initial value to an offeror, and (2) a portion of this initial value is subjected to the 
risks of the enterprise, and (3) the furnishing of the initial value is induced by the 
offeror’s promises or representations which give rise to a reasonable 
understanding that a valuable benefit of some kind over and above the initial value 
will accrue to the offeree as a result, of the operation of the enterprise, and (4) the 
offeree does not receive the right to exercise practical and actual control over the 
managerial decisions of the enterprise.”); Ronald J. Coffey, The Economic 
Realities of a “Security”: Is There a More Meaningful Formula?, 18 W. RES. L. 
REV. 367 (1967). 
 55 See, e.g., Kevin W. Humphries, Not Your Older Brother’s Bonds: The Use 
and Regulation of Social-Impact Bonds in the United States, 76 L. & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 443, 445 (2013) (“The risk-capital test is generally more inclusive than 
the Howey test.”). 
 56 See, e.g., Silver Hills Country Club, 361 P.2d at 908; Hawaii Mkt. Ctr., Inc., 
485 P.2d at 109. 
 57 Sec. Adm’r v. Coll. Assistance Plan (Guam) Inc., 533 F. Supp. 118, 123 (D. 
Guam 1981), aff’d, 700 F.2d 548 (9th Cir. 1983) (commenting on Jet Set Travel 
Club v. Corp. Comm’r, 535 P.2d 109 (Ore. Ct. App. 1975), which held that where 
memberships in travel club had materialized, the memberships were not 
investment contracts). 
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such a limitation on the risk capital test, it would clearly include an 
ICO since an ICO functions as a start-up investment. 
Other federal cases have discussed the risk capital analysis with 
apparent approval.58 However, it is at least questionable whether the 
risk capital analysis has had success under federal law where the 
Howey test would fail to find a security.59 Nevertheless, the more 
expansive risk capital analysis can trigger state securities law 
consequences for transactions not satisfying the four-pronged 
Howey test. In the event that the federal courts and SEC do not 
embrace the broader risk capital analysis, it remains viable for state 
securities administrators pursuing crypto currency transactions. 
Thus, it is conceivable that states will assert jurisdiction over crypto 
currencies as securities in instances where the SEC does not. 
                                                 
 58 See, e.g., Simon Oil Co. v. Norman, 789 F.2d 780, 781–82 (9th Cir. 1986) 
(relying on cases using the risk capital analysis to find oil and gas drilling interests 
were securities); Union Planters Nat’l Bank v. Commercial Credit Bus. Loans, 
651 F.2d 1174, 1181–82 (6th Cir. 1981) (applying risk capital analysis but finding 
that a loan participation agreement with a bank was not a security); Parvin v. 
Davis Oil Co., 524 F.2d 112, 114–16 (9th Cir. 1975) (using risk capital analysis 
to find undivided interests in oil and gas drilling were securities); SEC v. Koscot, 
Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473, 477 n.7 (5th Cir. 1974) (discussing risk capital 
analysis favorably); Bitter v. Hoby’s Int’l., Inc., 498 F.2d 183, 185 (9th Cir. 1974) 
(applying risk capital analysis but finding franchise arrangement was not a 
security); Home Guar. Ins. Corp. v. Third Fin. Servs, Inc., 667 F. Supp. 577 (M.D. 
Tenn. 1987) (applying risk capital analysis but finding mortgage loans and 
guarantees not to be securities); Brockton Sav. Bank v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell 
& Co., 577 F. Supp. 1281 (D. Mass. 1983) (applying risk capital analysis but 
finding that federally insured certificates of deposits were not securities); SEC v. 
Glen W. Turner Enters, Inc., 348 F. Supp. 766, 773–74 (D. Or. 1972), aff’d, 474 
F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1973) (“The spread of the risk capital theory from the state in 
which it was first applied to other states and the favorable comment with which it 
has been received make it an appropriate test to look to for determining what is 
‘commonly known as a security.’”). 
 59 See, e.g., Wieboldt v. Metz, 355 F. Supp. 255, 259 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (quoting 
Mr. Steak, Inc. v. River City Steak, Inc., 324 F. Supp. 640, 646 (D. Colo. 1970), 
aff’d, 460 F.2d 666, 670–71 (10th Cir. 1972)) (noting that adoption of a risk 
capital test “would work an unwarranted extension of the Securities Act”). 
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IV.  CRYPTO CURRENCY AS A SECURITY 
Although some have argued that crypto currencies are not 
securities,60 the better view is that crypto currency transactions often, 
if not generally, are subject to the securities laws.61 In 2017, the SEC 
issued a report concluding that in many circumstances, offers and 
sales of crypto currencies will be securities transactions and thus 
subject to the SEC regulatory regime.62 The court cases on point 
agree that crypto currencies can be characterized as securities. In 
SEC v. Shavers,63 the district court held that Bitcoin was a security 
even though the court acknowledged that it could be used as a 
currency as well.64 In United States v. Zaslavskiy,65 the district court 
upheld the sufficiency of an indictment charging securities fraud in 
connection with an ICO (Initial Coin Offering).66 The court in 
Zaslavskiy found the allegations were sufficient to uphold the claim 
that the crypto currency in question was a security under the test 
established by SEC v. Howey and its progeny.67 The court in 
Zaslavskiy noted, however, that ultimately the question of whether 
the crypto currency is a security would be a question for the jury.68 
                                                 
 60 See, e.g., Jeffrey E. Alberts & Bertrand Fry, Is Bitcoin a Security?, 21 B.U. 
J. SCI. & TECH. L. 1, 21 (2015); Kaplanov, supra note 15, at 160–61. 
 61 See, e.g., Yang, supra note 42, at 111 (discussing applicability of the 
securities laws); see also, e.g., Ethan D. Trotz, Tangled Up in Blue: Adapting 
Securities Laws to Initial Coin Offerings, 10 ELON L. REV. (Jan. 2019). 
 62 Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934: The DAO, Exchange Act Release No. 34-81207, 2017 WL 7184670 
(July 25, 2017) [hereinafter DAO Report]. 
 63 SEC v. Shavers, 2013 WL 4028182 (E.D. Tex. 2013). 
 64 Id. at *2 (“It can be used to purchase goods or services, and as Shavers stated, 
used to pay for individual living expenses. The only limitation of Bitcoin is that 
it is limited to those places that accept it as currency. However, it can also be 
exchanged for conventional currencies, such as the U.S. dollar, Euro, Yen, and 
Yuan. Therefore, Bitcoin is a currency or form of money . . . .”). 
 65 United States v. Zaslavskiy, 2018 WL 4346336 (E.D.N.Y. 2018). 
 66 Id. at *1. The indictment was based on alleged violations of the SEC’s general 
antifraud proscription found in section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 and SEC Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2018); 17 
C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2018). 
 67 Zaslavskiy, 2018 WL 4346336, at *9. 
 68 Id. But cf. Pettersson, supra note 29 (federal court denied preliminary 
injunction against digital coin offering to 32 “test investors”). 
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As noted above, it has been argued by some that crypto 
currencies are not securities because of the requirement of a profit 
expectation and that the profit is to be derived from the efforts of 
others.69 It has been argued that because it is a currency which can 
be used in commerce, investment in a crypto currency is based on 
its use as a currency rather than as an investment for profit.70 
However, the wild fluctuations in value and investor expectations 
undermine the claim that it is a currency rather than a security. 
Furthermore, there is evidence that a majority of transactions in 
crypto currencies are for investment or speculation rather than for 
barter.71 Also, as observed earlier, crypto currencies have no 
inherent value.72 Additionally, the value of a derivative currency is 
not derivative of a commodity, security, or anything else that has 
inherent value. Accordingly, the value of, and potential profit from, 
the currency is dependent upon others promoting and facilitating a 
market for the currency. This satisfies the Howey requirement that 
the profit be derived from the efforts of others. 
An ICO is the crypto currency’s counterpart to an initial public 
offering (“IPO”) of securities.73 There is no doubt that ICOs have 
                                                 
 69 See, e.g., Yang, supra note 42, at 111. 
 70 See, e.g., Alberts & Fry, supra note 60. 
 71 See, e.g., Camila Russo, Bitcoin Speculators, Not Drug Dealers, Dominate 
Crypto Use Now, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 7, 2018, 7:15 
AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-08-07/bitcoin-
speculators-not-drug-dealers-dominate-crypto-use-now. 
 72 See supra text accompanying note 4. 
 73 See, e.g., Shaanan Cohney, David Hoffman, Jeremy Sklaroff & David 
Wishnick, Coin-Operated Capitalism, COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3215345 (describing ICOs); 
Alexis Collomb, Primavera De Filippi & Klara Sok, From IPOs to ICOs: The 
Impact of Blockchain Technology on Financial Regulation (June 11, 2018) 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3185347 (comparing IPOs 
and ICOs); Marco Dell’Erba, Initial Coin Offerings: The Response of Regulatory 
Authorities, 14 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 1107 (2018) (discussing regulatory 
responses); see also, e.g., Hayden M. Baker, Tales from the Crypt: The Securities 
Law Implications of Initial Coin Offerings and a Framework for a Compliant 
ICO, 46 SEC. REG. L.J. 309 (2018) (discussing ICOs); Matthew J. Higgins, Recent 
Development, Munchee Inc.: A Turning Point for the Cryptocurrency Industry, 
97 N.C. L. REV. 220 (2018) (same); John D. Shire & James R. Billings-Kang, A 
Security is a Security: How Initial Coin Offerings May Trigger Securities 
Enforcement and Penalties, 23 WALL. ST. L. 1 (2019) (same); Julianna Debler, 
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raised a number of problems. For example, according to one study, 
half of ICOs are followed by the demise of the currency within a 
four-month period.74 The enhanced hazards of ICOs as compared to 
after-market crypto transactions are not by themselves a reason to 
reach different conclusions as to the applicability of the securities 
laws. Nevertheless, an SEC official indicated his belief that although 
ICOs are likely to involve securities, once the ICO is complete, the 
currency may cease to be a security.75 However, if a particular type 
of investment is a security when it is created, there is no precedent 
for treating it differently in the after-market. 
Crypto currencies’ volatility and high risk is beyond question. 
As noted earlier, the absence of a parallel regulatory scheme to 
reduce risk is a significant factor in deciding to classify something 
as a security.76 Given the high risk of purchasing virtual currency 
through an ICO or in secondary after-market transactions,77 the 
absence of another regulatory scheme argues strongly in favor of 
classifying virtual and crypto currencies as securities. The SEC has 
                                                 
Note, Foreign Initial Coin Offering Issuers Beware: The Securities and Exchange 
Commission is Watching, 51 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 245 (2018) (same); Trotz, supra 
note 61 (same). 
 74 Hugo Benedetti & Leonard Kostovetsky, Digital Tulips? Returns to Investors 
in Initial Coin Offerings (June 5, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3182169 (describing ICO failures); see Olga Kharif, Half 
of ICOs Die Within Four Months After Token Sales Finalized, BLOOMBERG (July 
9, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-07-09/half-of-icos-
die-within-four-months-after-token-sales-finalized (same). 
 75 William Hinman, Director, Div. of Corp. Fin., U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 
Digital Asset Transactions: When Howey Met Gary (Plastic) (June 14, 2018), 
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speech-hinman-061418; see also, e.g., 
Benjamin Bain & Lily Katz, Crypto Coins Surge as SEC Spares Ether from 
Securities Rules, BLOOMBERG (June 14, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/ne
ws/articles/2018-06-14/ether-surges-after-top-sec-official-says-it-s-not-a-
security. 
 76 See, e.g., Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 58 (1990). 
 77 See, e.g., DEAD COINS, https://deadcoins.com (last visited Feb. 19, 2019) 
(listing filed crypto currencies). 
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issued a number of investor alerts cautioning about virtual and 
crypto currencies and their investment risks.78 
Consider the analogy to an old-fashioned chain letter or to a 
Ponzi scheme.79 In both instances, something without any inherent 
value has value pumped into it so long as the participants are willing 
to contribute and pay the cost of keeping the scheme afloat. The 
                                                 
 78 Spotlight on Initial Coin Offerings and Digital Assets, SEC: INVESTOR.GOV, 
https://www.investor.gov/additional-resources/specialized-resources/spotlight-
initial-coin-offerings-digital-assets. 
 79 As explained in Stuart R. Cohn, The Impact of Securities Laws on Developing 
Companies: Would the Wright Brothers Have Gotten Off the Ground?, 3 J. SMALL 
& EMERGING BUS. L. 315 (1999): 
A Ponzi scheme is one that involves using new investor money to pay 
older investors a promised interest or other economic return. Investors 
are not aware of this circular use of invested funds and are falsely led to 
believe that the economic return is being generated by company 
operations, which are usually minimal or nonexistent. The term “Ponzi 
scheme” is derived from the notorious activities of Charles Ponzi in 
Boston, beginning in December 1919. Ponzi offered investors a 50% 
return on short-term notes, claiming that his company would earn huge 
amounts through the international trading of postal coupons. Interest 
payments were made on a timely basis, causing others to believe in the 
merits of the company. In fact, no business operations were ever 
undertaken. Ponzi collected over $14 million within eight months and 
made payments of approximately $9 million to his investors. The scheme 
was finally exposed in August 1920 by a Boston newspaper. Ponzi was 
sentenced to prison, from which he was paroled after three years. 
Following a second conviction several years later for a real estate fraud, 
he was deported to Italy and was employed by Mussolini in the Ministry 
of Finance. See In re Ponzi, 268 F. 997 (D.Mass.1920). 
The “slight” difference between a Ponzi scheme and a pyramid scheme was 
explained as follows by the First Circuit: 
While the terms Ponzi and “pyramid” often are used interchangeably to 
describe financial arrangements which rob Peter to pay Paul, the two 
differ slightly. In Ponzi schemes—named after a notorious Boston 
swindler, Charles Ponzi, who parlayed an initial stake of $150 into a 
fortune by means of an elaborate scheme featuring promissory notes 
yielding interest at annual rates of up to 50%—money tendered by later 
investors is used to pay off earlier investors. In contrast, pyramid 
schemes incorporate a recruiting element; they are marketing 
arrangements in which participants are rewarded financially based upon 
their ability to induce others to participate. 
SEC v. SG Ltd., 265 F.3d 42, 50 n.3 (1st Cir. 2001). 
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moment money stops flowing in from others, the Ponzi scheme 
collapses. Ponzi schemes clearly fall within the definition of 
securities.80 The same is true with respect to pyramid schemes which 
also fall within the definition of security.81 
ICOs should be treated as public offerings of securities. As noted 
above, the courts and the SEC agree that ICOs generally are subject 
to the securities laws.82 Among other things, this means that an ICO 
would be subject to the registration and prospectus delivery 
requirements of the Securities Act of 1933.83 
The foregoing discussion analyzes crypto currencies and ICOs 
under the two tests used by the courts for determining whether a 
security exists. ICOs satisfy both the Howey test and the more 
expansive risk capital analysis. Depending on the surrounding 
circumstances, secondary market transactions in crypto currencies 
are also likely to be subject to the securities laws. 
                                                 
 80 SEC v. Credit Bancorp, Ltd., 290 F.3d 80 (2d Cir. 2002) (describing how a 
Ponzi scheme violated securities antifraud provisions); SEC v. Infinity Grp. Co., 
27 F. Supp. 2d 559 (E.D. Pa. 1998), affd, 212 F.3d 180 (3d Cir. 2000) (upholding 
subject matter jurisdiction over Ponzi scheme); SEC v. Bennett, 889 F. Supp. 804 
(E.D. Pa. 1995) (stating a Ponzi scheme was a security); see also, e.g., SEC v. 
George, 426 F.3d 786 (6th Cir. 2005) (describing how a Ponzi scheme violated 
securities law antifraud provisions and prohibitions against unregistered 
offerings). 
 81 SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1974); see, e.g., 
SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1973). 
 82 See e.g., SEC v. Blockvest, LLC, 2019 WL 625163 (S.D. Cal. 2019) (finding 
that ICO involved securities and issuing a preliminary injunction); United States 
v. Zaslavskiy, 2018 WL 4346336 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) (upholding indictment 
alleging a fraud in connection with an ICO); SEC v. Shavers, 2013 WL 4028182 
(E.D. Tex. 2013) (ICO was an offering of securities); Complaint at 2, Blockvest, 
No. 18CV228718, 2019 WL 625163 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2018), 
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2018/comp24314.pdf; SEC Stops 
Fraudulent ICO that Falsely Claimed SEC Approval, Exchange Act Release No. 
245314, https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2018/lr24314.htm (Oct. 11, 
2018); DAO Report, supra note 62 (discussing digital currencies and the 
securities laws); see also, e.g., In the Matter of Gladius Network LLC, Securities 
Act Release No. 33-1068 (Feb. 20, 2019) (cease and desist order); Jennifer 
Bennett & Andrew Ramonas, Crypto Firm Gladius Self-Reports ICO, Avoids 
Fine, BLOOMBERG L. (Feb. 20, 2019), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/securities-
law/crypto-firm-gladius-self-reports-ico-avoids-sec-fine-1. 
 83 1933 Act §§ 5–10, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77e–77j (2018). 
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In contrast to digital coins that are traded for investments, coins 
that are strictly limited to use as a currency substitute may avoid 
securities law consequences. An SEC official has indicated that 
“[c]losed, fully-functional business ‘ecosystems’ that issue digital 
tokens through an initial coin offering may be able to avoid having 
to register their offerings as securities . . . .”84 For example, banking 
giant JPMorgan is implementing a digital coin to facilitate corporate 
payments by relying on blockchain rather than slower decentralized 
public legers.85 True utility tokens having no secondary investment 
market would likely not qualify as securities.86  This makes sense to 
the extent that such purely use-oriented tokens do not have an 
investment component and are purely operating as a currency 
substitute. 
                                                 
 84 See Lydia Beyoud, ‘Chuck E. Cheese’ Test May Tell SEC if Crypto Token a 
Security, BLOOMBERG L. (Dec. 12, 2018), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/bank
ing-law/chuck-e-cheese-test-may-tell-sec-if-crypto-token-a-security (quoting 
Jonathan Ingram, Deputy Chief Counsel of the Div. of Corp. Fin.). 
 85 See Michelle F. Davis & Alastair Marsh, JPMorgan to Use Digital Coin to 
Speed Up Corporate Payments, BLOOMBERG L. (Feb. 14, 2019), 
https://www.bloomberglaw.com/document/X58JLE3K000000?. 
 86 See, e.g., TurnKey Jet, Ink, SEC No Action Letter, 2019 WL 1554004 (Apr. 
3, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cf-noaction/2019/turnkey-jet-
040219-2a1.htm (providing that the SEC staff would not treat ICO of utility 
tokens as securities where 1) the issuer would not use the funds from token sales 
for operations or product development, 2) the token will have immediate 
functionality for purchasing the issuer’s services, 3) transfer of the tickets will be 
restricted to wallets authorized by the issuer, 4) each token throughout its 
existence will be limited to $1 value in exchange for the issuer’s services, 5) any 
offer by the issuer to repurchase the tokens would be at a discount from face value 
(unless pursuant to a court ordered liquidation), and 5) the token will be marketed 
in a way that emphasizes the token’s functionality rather than the potential for an 
increase in the token’s market value); Troy A. Paredes & Scott Kimpel, From 
Orange Groves to Cryptocurrency: How Will the SEC Apply Longstanding Tests 
to New Technologies, 20 FEDERALIST SOC’Y REV. 56, 60–61 (2019) (discussing 
utility tokes and the definition of security); Nate Crosser, Comment, Initial Coin 
Offerings as Investment Contracts: Are Blockchain Utility Tokens Securities?, 67 
U. KAN. L. REV. 379, 421–22 (2018) (suggesting that sale of true utility tokens 
should be viewed as sale of commodities); Max Dilendorf, Rika Khurdayan & 
Gleb Zaslavsky, INSIGHT: The Dual Nature of ‘Utility’ Tokens and Dual Token 
Structures, BLOOMBERG L. (Feb. 13, 2019), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/ 
corporate-law/insight-the-dual-nature-of-utility-tokens-and-dual-token-
structures. 
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V.  CONSEQUENCES OF CLASSIFYING A CRYPTO CURRENCY AS A 
SECURITY 
A. 1933 Act Registration Requirements 
As noted above, as an initial offering of securities, ICOs would 
have to be registered with the SEC under the 1933 Act. 1933 Act 
registration involves detailed disclosures about the investment being 
offered.87 One of the most significant disclosures for ICOs would be 
the description of investors’ risk factors.88 The detailed 1933 Act 
disclosures are also embodied in statutorily required prospectus 
disclosures that must be delivered to the investors during the 
offering process before the securities may be purchased.89 
Preparation of a registration statement is a long and expensive 
process, requiring detailed disclosures including those relating to 
investment risks.90 These disclosures would provide much more 
detail than investors would be likely to find in a white paper91 for an 
unregistered ICO. Thus, for example, full disclosure would assure 
that the description in the white paper and prospectus would match 
the actual code and the coins’ or tokens’ intended use. As noted 
directly above, the disclosures would also include a detailed 
description of the risk factors in the offering and coins or tokens 
                                                 
 87 S.E.C. Form S-1, 17 C.F.R. § 239.11 (2018) (form for 1933 Act registration); 
Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.10 (2018) (detailing the scope of the disclosure 
requirements). 
 88 Regulation S-K item 503, 17 C.F.R. § 229.503 (2018) (covering a prospectus 
summary, including risk factors); see also id., item 303, 17 C.F.R. § 229.303 
(2018) (covering management discussion and analysis, which elaborates on the 
types of risks and uncertainties that must be disclosed and discussed). 
 89 Securities Act of 1933 § 2(a)(10) (providing the definition of prospectus); id. 
§ 5(b) (providing prospectus delivery requirements); id. § 10 (providing statutory 
prospectus requirements); 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b(a)(10), 77e(b), 77j (2018). 
 90 See 1 HAZEN, supra note 1, § 3:6 (discussing the preparation of the 
registration statement). 
 91 A white paper is the narrative that describes the coins or tokens being offered. 
See, e.g., What is a White Paper and How to Write it, COINTELEGRAPH, 
https://cointelegraph.com/ico-101/what-is-a-white-paper-and-how-to-write-it 
(last visited Feb. 22, 2019); WHITEPAPER DATABASE (last visited Feb. 22, 2019) 
(supplying a database of crypto currency white papers). 
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being offered.92 Material misstatements in the registration statement 
can result in liability, which is strict liability for the issuer of the 
securities and negligence for other participants in the registration 
statement.93 
The registration process is divided into three periods. Prior to the 
filing of the registration statement with the SEC (the prefiling 
period), there are strict limitations on what can be said about the 
upcoming public offering.94 Once the registration statement is filed, 
there is a statutory twenty-day waiting period,95 which generally is 
considerably longer for an initial offering.96 Although statutorily-
qualified offers may be made during the waiting period,97 sales 
cannot be made until after the registration statement has become 
effective.98 The SEC has been vigorously pursuing unregistered 
ICOs.99 In addition to SEC enforcement, unregistered ICOs can 
result in private rights of actions by purchasers of the crypto 
currencies that should have been registered or that otherwise failed 
to comply with the 1933 Act’s registration requirements.100 
To summarize, absent an exemption from registration with the 
SEC,101 (1) offers to sell may not be made prior to filing the 
                                                 
 92 See SEC Regulation S-K, item 503, 17 C.F.R. § 229.503  (2018) (prospectus 
summary and risk factors). 
 93 1933 Act § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2018). 
 94 1933 Act § 5(c) prohibits offers to sell prior to the filing of the registration 
statement. 15 U.S.C. § 77e(c) (2018). “Offer to sell” is broadly defined to include 
any communication reasonably calculated to generate a buying interest. See 
§ 77b(a)(3) (providing the definition of “offer to sell”); Carl M. Loeb, Rhoades & 
Co., Exchange Act Release No. 5870, 38 S.E.C. 843, 844 (1959); SEC Rule 135, 
17 C.F.R. § 230.135 (2018). 
 95 1933 Act § 21 8(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77h(a) (2018). 
 96 See 1 HAZEN, supra note 1, §§ 2:15, 2:29 (discussing the waiting period). 
 97 1933 Act § 5(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77e(b)(1) (2018). 
 98 1933 Act § 5(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a) (2018). 
 99 See Two ICO Issuers Settle SEC Registration Charges, Agree to Register 
Tokens as Securities, SEC 18-264, 2018 WL 6011701 (Nov. 16, 2018), 
https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2018-264 (SEC); SEC Public Statement, 
supra note 30. 
 100 Section 12(a)(1) provides a right of rescission to purchasers of securities that 
were sold in violation of 1933 Act § 5. 15 U.S.C. § 77l(a)(1) (2018). 
 101 Exemptions are found in 1933 Act §§ 3, 4, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77c, 77d (2018). 
These exemptions are strictly construed and the burden of establishing an 
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registration statement,102 (2) after filing, offers must comply with the 
statutory prospectus delivery requirements,103 and (3) sales cannot 
be made until the registration becomes effective after the expiration 
of the statutory waiting period.104 
B. State Regulation 
In addition to SEC consequences, ICOs may implicate state 
securities laws (also known as blue sky laws).105 State securities law 
registration requirements would apply to ICOs unless registered 
with the SEC under the 1933 Act.106 State securities administrators 
have been quite active with respect to crypto currency 
transactions.107 For example, the North American Securities 
Administrators Association (“NASAA”) has flagged ICOs and 
crypto currency transactions in general as involving a high potential 
for securities fraud.108 NASAA also created a taskforce of state 
securities administrators to engage in “Operation Cryptosweep” that 
resulted in more than 200 inquiries or investigations and nearly 50 
enforcement actions in more than 40 states.109 
                                                 
exemption falls on the person claiming the exemption. See generally 1 HAZEN, 
supra note 1, ch. 4 (discussing 1933 Act exemptions). 
 102 1933 Act § 5(c), 15 U.S.C. § 77e(c) (2018). 
 103 1933 Act § 5(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77e(b) (2018). 
 104 1933 Act § 5(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a) (2018). 
 105 See, e.g., N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 78A-24–31. 
 106 See, e.g., In the Matter of Symatri, LLC, Order No. ENF-18-CDO-1765, 
(Tex. Securities Bd. June 11, 2018) (providing a cease and desist order against an 
ICO); see also, e.g., Karn Dhingra, Texas Crypto Fraud Enforcement Efforts go 
International, BLOOMBERG BNA: SEC. L. DAILY (Nov. 8, 2018), 
https://www.bloomberglaw.com/document/XCCLEODO000000?jcsearch=bna
%252000000166ef2ada49a966ffef5c2f0002#jcite. 
 107 See, e.g., Lydia Beyoud & Andrew Ramonas, Meet the State Enforcers on 
the Frontline of Crypto Fraud Fight, BLOOMBERG BNA (Mar. 20, 2018), 
https://www.bna.com/meet-state-enforcers-n57982090106/. 
 108 NASAA Reminds Investors to Approach Cryptocurrencies, Initial Coin 
Offerings and Other CryptoCurrency-Related Investment Productions with 
Caution, N. AM. SEC. ADMIN. ASSOC. (Jan. 4, 2018), 
http://www.nasaa.org/44073/nasaa-reminds-investors-approach-cryptocurrencies 
-initial-coin-offerings-cryptocurrency-related-investment-products-caution/. 
 109 See Operation Cryptosweep, N. AM. SEC. ADMIN. ASSOC., 
http://www.nasaa.org/regulatory-activity/enforcement-legal-activity/operation-
cryptosweep/ (last visited Nov. 6, 2018) (listing investigations and enforcement 
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Even where the state registration requirements are preempted by 
federal law, the state antifraud provisions would nevertheless apply 
to ICO transactions.110 There can be state law consequences beyond 
those imposed by securities laws.111 For example, Colorado recently 
issued an exemption from its money transmitter licensing rules for 
virtual currency exchanges that do not handle transactions between 
virtual and real currencies, but licensing would be required for 
exchanges allowing real currency transactions.112 New York has 
established a mechanism for the licensing of digital currency 
firms.113 
C. Exemptions from 1933 Act Registration 
Aside from recognizing ICOs as public offerings of securities, 
there are other 1933 Act issues. For example, what about secondary 
transactions apart from or in the aftermarket following an ICO?114 
The 1933 Act’s registration requirements apply absent an 
exemption. Sections 3 and 4 of the 1933 Act provide exemptions 
                                                 
actions); see also, e.g., Cryptocurrencies and Initial Coin Offerings, N.D. SEC. 
DEP’T, http://www.nd.gov/securities/enforcement-investment-fraud/crypto-
investments-bulletin (last visited Nov. 6, 2018). 
 110 The state registration requirements are preempted for federally registered 
offerings. 1933 Act § 16, 15 U.S.C. § 77p (2018). 
 111 See, e.g., Lydia Beyoud, N.Y. Attorney General Refers Three Crypto 
Exchanges for Probe, BLOOMBERG L. (Sept. 24, 2018), https://news.bloombergl
aw.com/banking-law/ny-attorney-general-refers-three-crypto-exchanges-for-
probe; see also Lydia Beyoud, House Lawmakers Plan Bill to Preempt State 
Crypto Regulation, BLOOMBERG L. (Sept. 25, 2018), 
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/banking-law/house-lawmakers-plan-bill-to-
preempt-state-crypto-regulation. 
 112 COLO. DEP’T OF REGULATORY AGENCIES, INTERIM REGULATORY 
GUIDANCE CRYPTOCURRENCY AND THE COLORADO MONEY TRANSMITTERS ACT 
(Sept. 20, 2018), http://src.bna.com/B1v. 
 113 See Evan Weinberger, N.Y. OKs Virtual Currency Firms to Use Nationwide 
Licensing Tool, BLOOMBERG L. (Oct. 1, 2018), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/ 
banking-law/ny-oks-virtual-currency-firms-to-use-nationwide-licensing-tool. 
 114 See, e.g., Alfredo B. D. Silva & F. Dario de Martino, Structuring Secondary 
Token Sales: How to Monetize Digital Tokens Under U.S. Securities Laws, 
BLOOMBERG L. (Sept. 18, 2018), https://www.bna.com/insight-structuring-
secondary-n73014482631/ (discussing the difference between ICOs and after-
market transactions). 
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that could be applicable to certain crypto currency transactions.115 
Section 4(a)(1) of the 1933 Act exempts most secondary securities 
transactions.116 As such, even though treated as securities, 
transactions in crypto currencies between buyers and sellers would 
not be subject to 1933 Act registration even though they would be 
subject to the securities laws’ anti-fraud117 and anti-manipulation118 
provisions. 
At least in theory, there are some other exemptions from 1933 
Act registration that could be used to avoid a full-fledged 1933 Act 
registration for an ICO. The exemptions for public offerings, which 
are described below, include offerings exempt under SEC 
Regulation A,119 qualifying crowdfunding offerings,120 and intrastate 
offerings.121 In addition, offerings made only to qualified investors 
can qualify for the exemption for offerings not involving a public 
offering.122 All of these, except potentially the non-public offering 
exemption, are not suitable for ICOs. 
Section 4(a)(2) of the 1933 Act exempts transactions not 
involving a public offering.123 As interpreted by the Supreme Court, 
                                                 
 115 17 U.S.C. §§ 77c, 77e (2018). 
 116 See 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(1) (2018), which exempts transactions not involving 
an issuer, underwriter or dealer. See generally 1 HAZEN, supra note 1, §§ 4:93–
4:102 (discussing the non-public offering exemption). 
 117 See, e.g., 1933 Act § 17(a); 1934 Act § 10(b); SEC Rule 10b-5; 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 77q, 78j(b) (2018); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2018). 1934 Act Rule 10b-5 
prohibits material misstatements and omissions of fact in connection with a 
purchase or sale of securities and also supports an implied private right of action. 
See 3 HAZEN, supra note 1, § 12:15. Scienter, or the intent to deceive, is an 
element of any Rule 10b-5 violation. See id. §§ 12:50-12:58. Section 17(a) of the 
1933 Act prohibits material misstatements and omissions in connection with the 
offer or sale of a security. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (2018). Section 17(a) thus applies 
to fraud by sellers of securities but not by purchasers. Although section 17(a) does 
not support an implied private right of action, scienter is not required and can be 
violated by negligent conduct. See HAZEN, supra note 1, §§ 12:50, 12:97. 
 118 See, e.g., 1934 Act §§ 9, 10(b), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i, 78j(b) (2018). 
 119 SEC Rules 251–63, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251–263 (2018). 
 120 1933 Act § 4(a)(6), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6) (2018). 
 121 1933 Act § 3(a)(11), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(11) (2018); SEC Rules 147, 147A, 
17 C.F.R. §§ 230.147, 230.147A (2018). 
 122 1933 Act § 4(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(2) (2018). 
 123 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(2) (2018). 
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a non-public offering involves an offering to sophisticated investors 
who are able to fend for themselves.124 Accordingly an ICO offered 
and sold only to qualifying investors would be exempt from the 
1933 Act registration requirements applicable to public offerings. 
This would include an offering solely to “accredited investors”125—
a concept that includes high wealth individuals.126 Therefore, private 
placements of ICO’s remain a viable option.127 However, if a public 
market develops in the wake of a private placement, the 1933 Act 
registration requirements likely would be implicated.128 In addition, 
1933 Act section 4(a)(5)129 and SEC Rule 504130 provide simpler 
exemptions for nonpublic offerings up to $5 million, provided the 
offering is made solely to accredited investors. The Rule 504 and 
section 4(a)(5) limited offering exemptions are simpler than the non-
public offering exemption under section 4(a)(2) or Rule 506131 
because those latter exemptions are likely to have additional 
limitations on the qualification of investors necessary for an exempt 
transaction.132 On the other hand, the non-public offering exemption 
                                                 
 124 See SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953); Doran v. Petrol. Mgmt. 
Corp., 545 F.2d 893 (5th Cir. 1977). 
 125 Accredited investor includes individuals with a net worth of at least $1 
million or an annual income of $200,000 (or joint annual income of $300,000). 
See SEC Rule 501(a)(1), 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(1) (2018). 
 126 SEC Rule 506 exempts offerings solely to accredited investors. 17 C.F.R. 
§ 230.506 (2018). 1933 Act § 4(a)(5) exempts offerings up to $5 million solely to 
accredited investors. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(5) (2018). In contrast, there is no dollar 
ceiling for a non-public offering under section 4(a)(2). 
 127 See, e.g., Olga Kharif, ICOs Alive and Well as Crypto Startups Go After 
Wealthy Buyers, BLOOMBERG L. (Feb. 13, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/ 
news/articles/2019-02-13/icos-alive-and-well-as-crypto-startups-go-after-
wealthy-buyers. 
 128 See generally HAZEN, supra note 1, § 4:88 (providing an overview of the 
non-public offering exemption). 
 129 15 U.S.C. § 77d(A)(5) (2018). 
 130 17 C.F.R. § 230.504 (2018). 
 131 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2018). 
 132 For example, the exemption for transactions not involving a public company 
require a showing of access to information and the investors’ ability to fend for 
themselves. See, e.g., SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953) (setting 
forth the requirements for the § 4(a)(2) exemption). See generally HAZEN, supra 
note 1, §§ 4:64–4:88. 
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under Rule 506 results in automatic preemption of any state 
securities law registration requirements.133 
Another exemption from 1934 Act registration is found in SEC 
Regulation A134 for offerings up to $50 million.135 Regulation A 
offerings operate much like a registered offering in that there is a 
required disclosure document and a waiting period after the 
disclosures are filed with the SEC until the effective date when sales 
may be made. Thus, any attempt to use Regulation A for an ICO 
would involve disclosures that are absent from other unregistered 
ICOs. 
A third at least theoretical, exemption would be the use of 
crowdsourcing for ICOs. Section 4(a)(5) of the 1933 Act provides 
an exemption from registration for offerings up to $1 million.136 The 
low dollar ceiling may render the crowdfunding exemption 
undesirable for ICOs. Although significantly less detailed than 
Regulation A or registered offerings, the crowdfunding exemption 
is conditioned on minimal disclosures.137 Another requirement for 
any crowdfunding offering is that the website or portal for the 
offering must be registered with the SEC.138 
A final exemption worth mentioning is the intrastate offering 
exemption.139 The statutory exemption for offers made solely within 
the borders of a single state requires that the issue be organized in 
and the business be substantially confined to that state.140 One 
practical difficulty is how to conduct an intrastate offering over the 
internet which by its very nature crosses state lines. The intrastate 
exemption provided in SEC Rule 147A not only avoids the 
                                                 
 133 15 U.S.C. § 77b(4)(F) (2018). 
 134 17 C.F.R. § 230.251 (2018). 
 135 17 C.F.R. § 230.251(a) (2018). Regulation A offers two tiers—offerings up 
to $20 million (tier 1) and offerings up to $50 million (tier 2). The primary 
difference between the two tiers is the level and detail of required disclosures. 
 136 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6) (2018). The dollar ceiling was raised to $1,070,000 
by SEC Crowdfunding Rule 100(a)(1), 17 C.F.R. § 227.100(a)(1) (2018). 
 137 17 C.F.R. §§ 227.201–.202 (2018). 
 138 The registration requirement for crowdfunding portals is set forth in 1933 
Act § 4A, 15 U.S.C.A. § 77d-1 (2018). 
 139 1933 Act § 3(a)(11), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(11) (2018); 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.147, 
147A (2018). 
 140 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(11) (2018). 
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requirement that the issuer of the securities be organized in the state 
of the offering, but it also allows offers beyond the state’s borders 
so long as out of state investors are excluded from the offering.141 If 
an intrastate ICO is economically viable, there could thus be an 
exemption from 1933 Act registration. However, the laws of most 
states would require that such an offering be registered under the 
applicable state blue sky law. 
The discussion above shows that the theoretically available 
exemptions for 1933 Act registration would likely not be feasible 
for an ICO. Furthermore, even if such an exemption could be used, 
it would only be an exemption from 1933 Act registration and would 
not impact the other consequences of an investment being classified 
as a security. Those consequences are discussed in the section that 
follows. 
D. Other Consequences of Classifying Crypto Currency as a 
Security 
Classifying a crypto currency as a security has a number of 
consequences beyond the 1933 Act’s registration requirements. The 
SEC has brought enforcement actions based on ICOs as unregistered 
securities offerings.142 The securities laws’ anti-fraud143 and anti-
manipulation144 provisions would apply to all crypto transactions. 
Virtual and crypto currencies are particularly ripe for manipulation. 
For example, virtual and crypto currencies have been susceptible to 
classic “pump and dump” manipulation.145 The SEC has noted this 
                                                 
 141 17 C.F.R. § 230.147A (2018). 
 142 E.g., Crypto Asset Mgmt., Securities Act Release 10544, Investment 
Company Act Release No. 33222, 2018 WL 4329663 (Sept. 11, 2018) (providing 
a cease and desist Order after finding an ICO violated the 1933 Act’s registration 
provisions); SEC v. Sharma, No. 1:18-cv-02909, 2018 WL 1603904 (S.D.N.Y. 
Apr. 2, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2018/comp-pr2018-
53.pdf (charging violations of 1933 Act registration requirements); SEC v. 
PlexCorps, No. 17-CIV-7007, 2017 WL 6398722 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 14, 2017) 
(charging fraud and registration violations in connection with ICOs). 
 143 E.g., 1933 Act § 17(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (2018); 1934 Act § 10(b), 15 
U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2018); SEC Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2018). 
 144 E.g., 1934 Act §§ 9–10, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i, 78j (2018). 
 145 See Shane Shifflett & Paul Vigna, Traders are Talking up Cryptocurrencies, 
Then Dumping Them, Costing Others Millions, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 5, 2018), 
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potential for securities manipulation in its denial of approval for 
exchange traded funds (“ETFs”) based on crypto currencies.146 
Following the SEC’s continued delay in addressing the Chicago 
Board Options Exchange’s (“Cboe”) application for a crypto 
currency ETF, the exchange withdrew its listing application.147 
However, following the end of the government shutdown, Cboe 
reapplied for listing of a bitcoin exchange traded fund.148 
The SEC also has brought enforcement actions charging 
manipulation and fraud in connection with crypto currency 
                                                 
https://www.wsj.com/graphics/cryptocurrency-schemes-generate-big-
coin/ (discussing crypto currency pump and dump schemes). In a classic pump 
and dump scheme, the perpetrator pumps up the market with hype and purchases 
of the target investment and then dumps the investment at a profit. See United 
States v. Zolp, 479 F.3d 715 (9th Cir. 2007) (upholding conviction for pump and 
dump scheme but remanding for resentencing); United States v. Gewin, 471 F.3d 
197 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (upholding fraud conviction in classic pump and dump 
scheme); Jerome E. Rosen, Litigation Release No. 44105, 2001 WL 333197 (Mar. 
27, 2001) (providing that the SEC initiated the proceedings based on allegations 
that the initiation of defendant engaged in classic pump and dump scheme by 
touting stock without disclosing that it received 60,000 shares to do so). See 
generally HAZEN, supra note 1, §§ 14:137, 14:150 (discussing registered broker-
dealer obligations). 
 146 See, e.g., Marion A. Brown, Comment, Cryptocurrency and Financial 
Regulation: The SEC’s Rejection of Bitcoin-Based ETPs, 23 N.C. BANK. INST. 
139 (2019) (discussing denial of ETF listing); David Scheer, SEC Quashes More 
Bitcoin ETF Pitches in Another Blow to Crypto, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 22, 2018), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-08-23/sec-quashes-more-
bitcoin-etf-pitches-in-another-blow-to-crypto (same). SEC Commissioner Peirce 
dissented from the denial and has voiced her objection elsewhere. See Hester M 
Peirce, Motherhood and Humble Pie: Remarks before the Cato Institute’s FinTech 
Unbound Conference, https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speech-peirce-091218 
(Sept. 12, 2018); see also, e.g., Self-Regulatory Organizations; Cboe BZX 
Exchange, Inc.; Order Instituting Proceedings to Determine Whether to Approve 
or Disapprove a Proposed Rule Change to List and Trade Shares of SolidX Bitcoin 
Shares Issued by the VanEck SolidX Bitcoin Trust Under BZX Rule 14.11(e)(4), 
Commodity-Based Trust Shares, Exchange Act Release No. 84231, 2018 WL 
4584243 (Sept. 20, 2018) (seeking public comments on ETF listing application). 
 147 See Ben Bain, CBOE Bitcoin ETF Application Pulled After Repeated SEC 
Delays, BLOOMBERG L. (Jan. 23, 2019), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/ 
securities-law/cboe-bitcoin-etf-application-pulled-after-repeated-sec-delays-1. 
 148 See Nick Baker, Cboe Reapplies to List the First Bitcoin ETF After SEC 
Reopens, BLOOMBERG L. (Feb. 1, 2019), https://www.bloomberglaw.com/ 
document/X34OELUS000000?udv_expired=true. 
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transactions.149 The potential for manipulation, as well as the 
uncertainty over the risks associated with crypto currencies, were 
also prominent in the SEC’s suspension of trading in virtual 
currency tracking certificates.150 The CFTC has also voiced concerns 
over crypto currency manipulation. For example, the CFTC secured 
a federal court order against a crypto currency boiler room 
operation.151 In addition to SEC enforcement efforts and CFTC 
initiatives, the Department of Justice launched criminal 
investigations into suspected crypto currency price manipulation.152 
The Department of Justice has also secured indictments based on 
securities fraud involving digital currency.153 
Anyone in the business of selling or promoting crypto currency 
transactions could be classified as a broker-dealer and thus subject 
to the 1934 Act’s broker-dealer registration requirements.154 The 
                                                 
 149 E.g., SEC Obtains Emergency Order Halting Fraudulent Coin Offering 
Scheme, S.E.C. 18-94, 2018 WL 2411301 (May 29, 2018); see also, e.g., Camilo 
Russo & Benjamin Robertson, Crypto’s Open Secret: Multibillion-Dollar Volume 
is Suspect, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 26, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/arti
cles/2018-09-27/crypto-s-open-secret-its-multibillion-dollar-volume-is-suspect 
(discussing crypto manipulation and pending criminal investigation). 
 150 In the Matter of Certain Bitcoin/Ether Tracking Certificates, File No. 500-1, 
SEC (Sept. 9, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/suspensions/2018/34-84063-
o.pdf (order of suspension of trading); see also Statement on Order of Suspension 
of Trading of Certain Bitcoin/Ether Tracking Certificates, 
U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Sept. 20, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-
statement/suspension-trading-certain-bitcoinether-tracking-certificates. 
 151 CFTC v. McDonnell, No. 18-CV-361 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2018), 
https://www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/2018-
08/enfdropmarketsmemorandum082318.pdf (memorandum order imposing 
sanctions); CFTC v. McDonnell, 321 F. Supp. 3d 366 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) (upholding 
CFTC jurisdiction to pursue crypto currency); CFTC v. McDonnell, 287 F. Supp. 
3d 213 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) (holding that virtual currency was subject to CFTC 
jurisdiction and issuing a preliminary injunction). 
 152 See, e.g., Matt Robinson & Tom Schoenberg, Bitcoin Rigging Criminal 
Probe Said to Home in on Tether, BLOOMBERG L. (Nov. 20, 2018), https://news. 
bloomberglaw.com/securities-law/bitcoin-rigging-criminal-probe-said-to-home-
in-on-tether-1-1 (describing the criminal investigation). 
 153 See Dep’t of Just. News Release, Cryptocurrency CEO Indicted After 
Defrauding Investors of $4 Million, 2018 WL 6243047 (Nov. 28, 2018). 
 154 Among other things, broker-dealers in securities, absent an exemption, must 
register with the SEC and with the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority 
(FINRA). Section 15 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78o 
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SEC has in fact brought enforcement actions for crypto currency 
sales by an unregistered broker-dealer.155 The Financial Industry 
Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”) also requires registration of 
broker-dealers.156 Thus, for example, FINRA has pursued registered 
broker-dealers and associated persons157 FINRA announced an 
enforcement priority for supervising and monitoring digital 
currency transactions by FINRA member broker-dealers and 
associated persons.158 
To the extent that secondary or after-market transactions in 
crypto currencies involve securities, any web portal or exchange for 
                                                 
(2018). See, e.g., Benjamin Bain, Brokers’ Cryptocurrency Deals Are Focus of 
SEC Review, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 2, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/ 
news/articles/2018-08-02/brokers-cryptocurrency-deals-are-said-to-be-focus-of-
sec-review. See generally HAZEN, supra note 1, ch. 14 (discussing broker-dealer 
regulation). 
 155  Tokenlot, LLC, Securities Act Release No. 33-10543, Securities Exchange 
Act Release No. 34-84075, Investment Company Act Release No. IC-33221 
(Sept. 11, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2018/33-10543.pdf (cease 
and desist order against crypto currency transactions by unregistered broker-
dealer). 
 156 See 15 U.S.C. § 780-3 (2018) (providing the statutory authority for 
registered securities associations). See generally 4 Hazen, supra note 1 §§ 14:7, 
14:24 (discussing self-regulation, FINRA’s role, and market regulation). 
 157 As defined by the 1934 Act: 
The term “person associated with a broker or dealer” or “associated 
person of a broker or dealer” means any partner, officer, director, or 
branch manager of such broker or dealer (or any person occupying a 
similar status or performing similar functions), any person directly or 
indirectly controlling, controlled by, or under common control with such 
broker or dealer, or any employee of such broker or dealer, except that 
any person associated with a broker or dealer whose functions are solely 
clerical or ministerial shall not be included in the meaning of such term 
. . . . 
15 U.S.C. 78c(a)(18) (2018). 
 158 See 2019 Annual Risk Monitoring and Examination Priorities Letter, 
FINRA (Jan. 22, 2019), http://www.finra.org/industry/2019-annual-risk-
monitoring-and-examination-priorities-letter; 2018 Regulatory and Examination 
Priorities Letter, FINRA (Jan. 8, 2018), http://www.finra.org/industry/2018-
regulatory-and-examination-priorities-letter; Andrew Ramonas, Brokerage 
Regulator to Step Up Scrutiny of Crypto Assets in 2019, 
BLOOMBERG L. (Jan. 22, 2019), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/securities-
law/brokerage-regulator-to-step-up-scrutiny-of-crypto-assets-in-2019. 
APR. 2019] Tulips, Oranges, Worms, and Coins 525 
those transactions would have to be registered as a securities 
exchange under the 1934 Act.159 Earlier this year, the death of a 
Canadian exchange’s CEO resulted in a potential loss of hundreds 
of millions of dollars since no one else had the encryption key to 
unlock the exchange’s crypto currency wallets.160 It is conceivable 
that regulation as an exchange might have prevented this scenario. 
Other potential problems with exchanges include the potential of 
manipulation161 which could be curtailed with exchange regulation. 
State securities administrators have also pursued online 
platforms for crypto currencies.162 There has been some preliminary 
movement in Congress to preempt the states with respect to crypto 
currency regulation163 but there is no indication that anything is 
likely to happen soon. 
The Investment Advisers Act of 1940 requires registration of 
professionals charging for securities related investment advice.164 
                                                 
 159 1934 Act § 6, 15 U.S.C. § 78f (2018); see, e.g., Zachary Coburn, Exchange 
Act Release No. 84,553 (Nov. 8, 2018) (cease and desist settlement order); DIV. 
OF ENF’T, DIV. OF TRADING & DIV. OF MKTS., U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, SEC 
Public Statement on Potentially Unlawful Online Platforms for Trading Digital 
Assets (Div. of Trading & Markets Mar. 7, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/ 
news/public-statement/enforcement-tm-statement-potentially-unlawful-online-
platforms-trading; see also, e.g., Dennis Chu, Note, Broker-Dealers for Virtual 
Currency: Regulating Cryptocurrency Wallets and Exchanges, 118 COLUM. L. 
REV. 2323 (2018) (suggesting the regulation of broker-dealers as potential 
guidance for the regulation of cryptocurrency platforms). 
 160 See Doug Alexander, Crypto CEO Dies Holding Only Passwords That Can 
Unlock Millions in Customer Coins, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 4, 2019), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-02-04/crypto-exchange-
founder-dies-leaves-behind-200-million-problem; see also, e.g., Doug 
Alexander, Quadriga Fuels Race Among Lawyers for Slice of Lost Millions, 
BLOOMBERG (Feb. 12, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-
02-12/quadriga-sparks-race-among-lawyers-for-slice-of-lost-millions. 
 161 See supra text accompanying notes 144–146. 
 162 See, e.g., Press Release, N.Y. Attorney Gen., A.G. Schneiderman Launches 
Inquiry Into Crypto Currency “Exchanges” (Apr. 17, 2018), https://ag.ny.gov/ 
press-release/ag-schneiderman-launches-inquiry-cryptocurrency-exchanges. 
 163 See Lydia Beyoud, Colorado Exempts Some Crypto Exchanges from 
Licensing Rules, BLOOMBERG BNA: SEC. L. DAILY (Sept. 25, 2018), 
https://www.bloomberglaw.com/document/X29IVKPO000000?jcsearch=bna%2
5200000016608f7d667a56f0bff4e020000#jcite. 
 164 Investment Advisers Act § 203, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3 (2018). 
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Accordingly, giving advice regarding crypto currencies can thus 
trigger those registration requirements.165 
In addition to federal law consequences, the states regulate 
securities broker-dealers. Thus, enforcement actions may be brought 
by state regulators against broker-dealers who violate the state 
securities laws broker-dealer registration provisions.166 A number of 
state securities regulators have been active in pursuing crypto 
currency transactions.167 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Crypto currency markets have been exceptionally volatile. Many 
investors have suffered massive losses. The need for regulating 
these high-risk markets should be evident from its performance over 
the years. Although there are only a handful of decisions to date, the 
SEC and the courts agree that initial coin offerings involve an 
offering of securities and thus are subject to SEC regulation. These 
decisions are headed in the right direction. By applying the Supreme 
Court’s test of what type of investment qualifies as a security, many 
if not all crypto currency transactions warrant scrutiny under the 
securities laws. Even beyond ICOs, crypto currency transactions 
often will implicate the securities laws. For example, the antifraud 
provisions as well as the broker-dealer and exchange registration 
requirements for those in the business of marketing crypto 
currencies should be applied to many crypto currency transactions. 
In the unlikely event that federal regulation can be avoided, state 
securities laws have used a broader test for classifying investments 
as securities. Accordingly, state laws may reach transactions not 
pursued by the SEC. It follows that with the exception of true utility 
                                                 
 165 Crypto Asset Mgmt., LP, Securities Act Release No. 10,544, Investment 
Advisers Act Release No. 5,004, Investment Company Act Release No. 33,222, 
Administrative Proceeding No. 3-18740 (Sept. 11, 2018) (SEC Cease and Desist 
Order) (noting the ICO violated Investment Advisers Act registration provisions). 
 166 See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 78A-39 (2017) (providing that enforcement 
actions can include “[d]enial, revocation, suspension, censure, cancellation and 
withdrawal of [broker-dealer] registration”). 
 167 See, e.g., Cryptocurrencies and Investing, N.C. SECRETARY OF 
STATE, https://www.sosnc.gov/divisions/securities/cryptocurrencies_and_investi
ng (last visited Nov. 6, 2018). 
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tokens with no investment market, many, if not most crypto 
currencies are likely to implicate the securities laws at least at some 
point during their life cycle. 
